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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CERTIORARI-INTEGRITY OF THE RULE OF FOUR-
In four recent cases involving the Federal Employers Liability Act1 the 
Supreme Court of the United States, after granting certiorari, reviewed 
the facts of the cases to determine if there was sufficient evidence to allow 
the cases to be heard by a jury.2 Justice Frankfurter in a lengthy dissent-
135 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51 to 60. 
2 Rogers v. Missouri, 352 U.S. 500 (1957}; Webb v. Illinois R., 352 U.S. 512 (1957); 
Herdman v. Pennsylvania R., 352 U.S. 518 (1957); Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 
352 U.S. 521 (1957). 
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ing opinion refused to hear these cases on their merits.3 He would have dis-
missed them on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted, al-
though no new evidence warranted this conclusion. Justice Frankfurter 
maintained that any justice has a right to refuse to hear a case after 
certiorari has been granted, and that the rule of four is not inflexible, 
particularly when a class of cases is systematically taken for review. 
An appeal on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States 
was originally available to all unsuccessful litigants in the federal courts, 
and to all those in state courts if a federal question was involved.4 How-
ever, since 1891, when circuit courts of appeals were established, the Su-
preme Court has been allowed an increasing amount of discretion as to 
which cases it will review.5 Circuit court decisions were made final in 
cases of several types in 19116 and 1916.7 Finally, in the Judiciary Act of 
1925 circuit court decisions were made final in almost all cases, and, in 
general, a writ of error from lower federal courts to the Supreme Court 
was not available.8 During this period also the number of cases entitled 
to a writ of error from state courts was drastically cut.9 The writ of cer-
tiorari has thus become the principal means for obtaining review by the 
Supreme Court.10 The granting of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary 
act by the Court,11 and is without control from any source. On occasions 
when the Court's certiorari policy was being debated, members of 
the Supreme Court have testified to Congress, however, that a self-
imposed safeguard was present to prevent unduly limiting access to the 
3 Principal case at 524-558. The opinion contains a listing of all cases since 1911 in 
which the Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of the evidence in cases involving 
the FELA. 
41 Stat. 81 (1789) gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over circuit courts, 
and I Stat. 85 (1789) provides a writ of error from decisions of the highest court of the 
various states. 
5 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Certiorari was provided for decisions otherwise final. However, 
a writ of error to the Supreme Court was still available for cases involving capital 
crimes, prizes, conflict of state laws and constitutions with the United States Constitution, 
constitutional issues, or construction of federal statutes. 
6 36 Stat. 1133 (1911) provided that circuit court opinions were final in all diversity 
cases, and cases involving patents, copyrights, revenue laws, criminal laws, and admiralty 
questions. 
7 39 Stat. 726 (1916). Circuit court decisions were made final in all cases involving 
bankruptcy, Federal Employers' Liability Act, and the Safety Appliance Act. 
8 43 Stat. 936 (1925). This is essentially the present act. 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1254, 1257. 
9 39 Stat. 726 (1916). 
10 See official statement showing number of cases filed, disposed of, and remaining 
on dockets at conclusion of October Terms 1946, 1947, and 1948 appearing at 337 U.S. 
963 (1949). See also, Harper and Rosenthal, "What the Supreme Court Did Not Do in 
the 1949 Term," 99 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 293 (1950); and similar articles covering the 1950, 
1951 and 1952 terms in the Supreme Court: 100 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 354 (1951); IOI UNIV. 
PA. L. REV. 439 (1953); 102 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 427 (1954). 
11 See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. 
IV, 1957) §2071. Rule 19 begins: "A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, 
but of sound judicial discretion. • " 
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Court.12 This safeguard is the rule of four.18 This rule allows a minority 
of four justices to decide if a particular case is worth being heard on its 
merits by the Court as a whole. The rule is generally recognized as an es-
tablished practice of the court.14 On rare occasions, after granting certiorari 
and hearing argument, the Court will decide that on the basis of new or 
undisclosed evidence the ·writ of certiorari was improvidently granted, and 
will dismiss the case without deciding it on its merits.15 In the principal 
cases, Justice Frankfurter does not argue that there is any new evidence 
present, but states that these cases should not be heard on the merits be-
cause certiorari should never have been granted in the first place. Justice 
Frankfurter argues that "not four, not eight, Justices can require another 
to decide a case that he regards as not properly before the Court."16 He 
considers the right to dissent paramount, but would respect the rule of 
four when individual cases were involved. He feels, however, that the 
rule has no meaning when a class of cases is given what he considers to be 
a favored 'position. Justice Frankfurter feels strongly that cases involving 
the Federal Employers Liability Act, on questions of sufficiency of the 
evidence to send the case to a jury, have no place in the business of the 
Supreme Court,17 and refuses to hear them on their merits. It seems clear 
that the position of Justice Frankfurter serves to annul the effect of the 
rule of four and is thus contrary to the established practice of the Court. 
12 Justice Van Devanter testified before the Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the Senate on S. 2060 and 2061, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 29 (1924), and explained 
the certiorari policy of the Court as follows, "For instance, if there were five votes against 
granting the petition and four in favor of granting it, it would be granted, because we 
proceed upon the theory that when as many as four members of ~he court, and even 
three in some instances, are impressed with propriety of our taking the case the petition 
should be granted." Justices Van Devanter and Brandeis testified before the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2176, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 9-10 (1924), and explained 
the rule of four at that time also. In addition, during the debate on President Roosevelt's 
plan to increase the size of the judiciary, the certiorari policy of the Court was discussed 
at length. The rule of four was cited to answer critics who complained about the small 
number of writs which were granted. See Letter of Chief Justice Hughes to Senator 
Wheeler, March 23, 1937, and debate involving this letter printed in 81 CONG. REc. 2813 
(1937). 
18 For discussion of the rule, see STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 
2d ed., 145 (1954); WOLFSON AND KURLAND, ROBERTSON AND KIRKHAM JURISDICTION OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES §314 (1951). 
14 Chief Justice Stone in Bailey v. Central Vermont R., 319 U.S. 350 at 359 (1943), 
said, "But as we have adhered to our long standing practice of granting certiorari upon 
the affirmative vote of four Justices, the case is properly here for decision and is, I 
think, correctly decided." See also dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in United 
States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 at 298 (1951); Burton, "Judging Is Also Administration," 
33 A.B.A.J. 1099 at ll64 (1947); 21 TEMP. L. Q. 77 at 84 (1947); Boskey, "Mechanics of 
the Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction," 46 CoL. L. REv. 255 at 257 (1946). 
15 See STERN AND GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, 2d ed., 158 (1954). 
16 Principal case at 528. 
17 Id. at 525-539. For more examples of Justice Frankfurter's views on this subject 
see particularly his dissenting opinon in Carter v. Atlantic & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 
338 U.S. 430 (1949), and his concurring opinion in Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 
(1948). 
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Seven of the present justices of the Court expressed disapproval of Justice 
Frankfurter's position on this question. Speaking through Justice Harlan, 
they stated that it is in respect to classes of cases where established cleavages 
of the judges are likely to arise that the rule of four becomes most im-
portant.18 The rule of four is not a rule laid down by Congress, but is a 
working rule of the Supreme Court itself. Determining whether a partic-
ular case involves issues important enough to warrant a hearing by the full 
Court is one of the most subjective decisions which a justice can make. 
The rule of four basically involves respecting the value judgments of fel-
low justices. If four justices believe an issue is of such importance that 
it should be decided by the Court, a due regard for the rule and for the 
other justices then appears to require each justice not only to decide the 
case on its merits, but also to attempt to reappraise his own position as to 
the value of the issue involved. If five justices followed the position of 
Justice Frankfurter, the rule of four would become meaningless, and a 
majority would control. The rule is important in that it allows greater 
flexibility in the types of cases which the Court will review. The existence 
and integrity of the rule of four demand that each justice decide all cases 
in which certiorari is granted on its merits. 
Robert L. Knauss, S. Ed. 
18 Principal case at 561-562. See also Justice •Douglas' comments on the "integrity of 
the rule of four" in his dissent in United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 at 298 (1951). 
